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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DDO Priorities and Planning

1. In the last several months, you and I have discussed a number of areas where I feel strongly that the DDO needs to make an extra effort to rebuild capabilities that have deteriorated or to strike out in new, high-priority directions. At present, I am not certain exactly what you have underway, how much progress is being made, problems you are encountering, or what further steps you plan in several of these areas. I have discussed this with Admiral Inman and found that he has no clearer picture than I do.

2. I believe the remedy to this situation, for us to be better informed but more importantly to help the DDO make orderly progress, would be for you to provide to me your plans, with specific milestones to measure progress, for accomplishing the following:

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3. Once I approve these plans, I intend to ask the Office of Policy and Planning/Planning Staff to work with you and the appropriate division chiefs to follow their implementation and provide periodic reports to me on progress. I would like to have all of the proposed plans by 13 November.

William J. Casey

cc: D/OPP

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving the Quality of Intelligence

1. As you know, I have strongly supported your reorganization of NFAC. I think it makes a lot of sense and will help resolve a number of management and coordination problems characteristic of the past. I also hope that the consolidation of political, economic, and military research along regional lines will set the stage for developing NFAC's capability to do politico-military analysis and cross-discipline analysis, two important problems I mentioned in my memorandum to you on 3 April concerning problems of analysis.

2. There are some other areas, however, where I do not believe the reorganization in and of itself will address some of the analytical problems that concern me. I assume that, as you proceed with the reorganization, you also are looking to correct problems of analysis that will not necessarily be remedied by the reorganization. Specifically, I continue to be concerned that NFAC's research program is developed from "the bottom-up" rather than from "the top-down." It is my impression judging from your catalogs that I have reviewed and my conversations with analysts that a high percentage of work done in NFAC is self-initiated by the analysts and relates to subjects in which they are interested. Obviously, often these are of great value. At least as often, however, they bear little relevance to issues and problems of concern to policymakers. I am also concerned that we are not doing enough to refresh the skills and area backgrounds of our analysts through periodic training--such as occasional courses in local universities; developing a capability for doing geostrategic or macro-analysis; instilling in analysts the realization that they are analysts working for the Government rather than academicians who just happen to work for CIA; and the propensity, which will in fact be accentuated by the NFAC reorganization, to look at problems in different parts of the world--such as Central America, North/Central Africa, Southern Africa, and so forth--in isolation and without regard for the role that countries in other regions (such as Libya, the Soviet Union, Cuba, etc.) play in local or regional conflicts.

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3. I have discussed these problems with Admiral Inman, and we agree that they are not likely to be addressed in the absence of a specific plan with specific milestones to measure progress. I would like you to prepare for me your proposed plan for improving the quality of intelligence during the next year to 18 months, including the specific milestones--both programmatic and in terms of time--that will be used to measure progress. This plan should include how you intend to address the problems I have mentioned above, that is, development of a research plan based on "top-down" guidance; how you intend in the new structure to plan cross-disciplinary analysis; your plan for brushing up the substantive skills of your analysts; and your plan for developing cross-regional and broad geopolitical/geostrategic analytical capability. This plan should, of course, include any other initiatives you have in mind for improving the quality of intelligence analysis.

4. Once I have approved your plans, I intend to ask the Office of Policy and Planning/Planning Staff to be in close touch with your people in order to follow progress on implementation and to keep me informed. I would like to have your plans along the lines noted above by 13 November.

William J. Casey

cc: D/OPP

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Terrorism

1. I believe the threats Qadhafi has made against the U.S. and the President, the bombings in Germany, and other terrorist acts in recent weeks are a harbinger of increased terrorist activity, perhaps on a scale not seen before. I am concerned that we are not doing enough in this area, both in terms of collection and analysis. I would like you to prepare a brief report for me on your present capabilities for collecting against terrorism and analyzing international terrorism and what plans you may have for expanding that capability.

2. Additionally, I am concerned that informal contacts between DDO and NFAC on terrorism may not be sufficient. I would like for the two of you to give me a report on what kind of collaboration presently exists between NFAC and DDO and your suggestions for what might be done to ensure the closest possible collaboration and interaction between the collectors and the analysts. I would like these reports by 23 October.

William J. Casey

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